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JURISDICTION 
Appellee United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company ( now The St. Paul 
Companies, but for ease of reference for the parties and the Court of Appeals, hereinafter 
"USF&G"), adopts by reference Appellants' jurisdictional statement. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
1. Does an insurer who has obtained summary judgment in its favor that it owes 
no duty to defend a corporation under a liability policy, face exposure to sole shareholders of that 
corporation, who are also named insureds under the same policy, or is their claim moot? 
2. Do shareholders of a corporation that has been denied coverage by an insurer 
under a liability policy have a separate non-derivative claim against the insurer for monies expended 
for defense of the corporation and for related consequential danger? 
These cases were decided by summary judgment, and the issue of right to summary 
judgment is a question of law reviewed for correctness with no deference to the trial court's legal 
conclusions. Universal Underwriters Ins. Co. v. State Farm Mut Auto Ins., 925 P.2d 1270, 1273 
(Utah Ct. App. 1996). Facts and inferences to be drawn therefrom are viewed in light most favorable 
to the party opposing summary judgment. Broadwater v. Old Republic Sun, 854 P.2d 527 (Utah 
1993). The issues raised by USF&G (with the exception of the mootness issue relating to USF&G 
having received summary judgment in its favor on the coverage issue, which was decided after the 
briefing on the motions below) were raised and argued in USF&G's Memorandum in support of its 
Motion to Dismiss or in the Alternative for Summary Judgment (R. 20-95) and were raised and 
argued in USF&G's Reply Memorandum (R. 398-404). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUTES 
Appellee does not contend that there is any statute that is determinative of the issues 
on appeal in this matter. 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. 
This is an appeal from a final judgment in a civil action. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition Below. 
The Stocks filed a Verified Complaint on December 12, 1997. (R. 1-12.) On 
January 30, 1998, USF&G filed a Motion to Dismiss or, in the Alternative, Motion for Summary 
Judgment asserting three grounds for dismissal: (1) that Fred and Brenda Stocks, as individual 
shareholders, did not have the right to sue USF&G for wrongs allegedly done to their corporation; 
(2) that the exact issue had already been determined by the Court in the case of Timber Products, Inc. 
v. Paul David Redd, etaly Civil No. 940700057 CR (Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San 
Juan County, State of Utah); and (3) that the claim had been brought in violation of the applicable 
statute of limitations. (R. 20-21.) Talbert also filed a Motion to Dismiss, asserting (1) statute of 
limitations; (2) lack of standing of individual shareholders to bring claims that rightly belong with the 
corporation; and (3) waiver and estoppel. (R. 96-97.) 
Oral argument on the Motions was held August 19,1998. (R. 408.) On February 22, 
1999, the Court issued a written ruling determining that the prior Order of the Court in the Timber 
Products case was not a final judgment sufficient to invoke res judicata but found that with respect 
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to the Stocks, no action had been filed against them personally by anyone, and neither USF&G nor 
Talbert had been asked to provide a defense or indemnity to the Stocks and, therefore, they face no 
exposure in their claims, including the claims for emotional distress, which were entirely derivative 
of the claims made against TPI. The Court further found that their injuries were not separate and 
distinct from those suffered by the corporation and, therefore, they lacked standing in their individual 
capacities to bring the suit. (R. 408-10.) Formal Orders granting the Motions were entered on 
June 16, 1999. (R. 412-14, 415-19.) 
G Statement of Facts. 
The following facts are undisputed. 
Fred and Brenda Stocks are officers and principle shareholders of a Utah corporation 
known as Timber Products, Inc. ("TPI") (R. 1-2, ffif 1-2.) In 1992, Paul David Redd and other 
members of his family entered into a timber harvesting contract with TPI. (R. 142, ^ 8.) 
On June 14, 1994, TPI was insured by USF&G under a master insurance contract, 
policy number 1MP30088353900, with a policy period from June 30, 1993 to June30, 1994. (R. 3.) 
On June 14, 1994, a forest fire ("forest fire") occurred on certain timber lands owned by the Redd 
family ("Redds") from which TPI was then harvesting timber. (R. 5, If 11.) 
The forest fire was claimed by the Redds and by San Juan County to have been 
negligently started by an employee of an independent logging contractor who was harvesting timber 
for TPI from the lands owned by the Redds. (R. 5, ^  12.) TPI requested both defense and indemnity 
from USF&G under the insurance contract because of the claims made by the Redds and San Juan 
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County. On or about July 12, 1994, USF&G denied coverage for the claims made against TPI by the 
Redds and San Juan County. (R. 24, % 6.) 
In December of 1994, TPI filed a Complaint for declaratory relief against the Redds, 
USF&G, Talbert, Don Applegate Construction, Kelling Insurance Agency and Northfield Insurance 
Company. The case is venued in the Seventh Judicial District Court in and for San Juan County, 
State of Utah, Civil No. 94070057 CV (hereinafter the "Original Action"). (R. 24, U 8.) 
In March of 1995, TPI filed a Second Amended Complaint in the Original Action. 
The Redd Defendants filed amended counterclaims and cross-claims. The amended counterclaims 
do not plead any causes of action against the Stocks, but allege claims only against TPI. The 
cross-claim was against Applegate, only. (R. 24, ^ 9; R. 68-88; see Addendum at A.) 
On December 9,1996, TPI filed a Motion to Intervene as Parties Plaintiff and Motion 
for Order Granting Leave to File and Serve a Third Amended Complaint seeking to add the Stocks 
individually as Plaintiffs in the Original Action. USF&G, Talbert, Northfield and other Defendants 
opposed this Motion arguing that it was both untimely and that the Stocks, as individual shareholders 
of TPI, could not bring a suit in their capacity as individual shareholders for an alleged wrong done 
by a third party to the corporation. (R. 25, U 10; see Addendum at B.) 
On July 14, 1997, the trial court entered an Order denying Plaintiffs Motion to 
Intervene and Motion for Order Granting Leave to File and Serve a Third Amended Complaint. The 
Court denied the Motions for two reasons: the first being that the Motions were untimely. The 
second reason, however, was that the Court was persuaded that the law in Utah is that a shareholder 
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of a corporation may not bring a suit in his or her individual capacity as a shareholder for the wrong 
done to the corporation by a third person. The Court determined that the claims by the Stocks fit 
within the perimeters of that maxim of Utah law. (R. 25; R. 90-94.) 
TPI filed an interlocutory appeal of the Court's ruling, but that was denied by the Utah 
Supreme Court. On December 12, 1997, the verified Complaint was filed in the action of FredK. 
Stocks andBrenda K. Stocks v. United States Fidelity and Guaranty Co. and The Talbert Corp., 
Civil No. 9707-87, in the Seventh Judicial District Court of San Juan County, State of Utah. (R. 25, 
U 12; R. 1-12.) 
As noted above, USF&G and Talbert filed Motions to dismiss and/or for summary 
judgment and, on February 22, 1999, the trial court issued a written ruling granting the Defendants' 
Motions and dismissing the verified Complaint. In the Original Action, TPI and USF&G had filed 
cross-motions for summary judgment on the enforceability of a fire damage exclusion in the USF&G 
contract of insurance. On February 18,1999, the trial court issued a ruling on USF&G's Motion for 
Partial Summary Judgment finding that the exclusion was unambiguous and enforceable and excluded 
coverage for property damage due to the forest fire that occurred in June of 1994. The Court found 
that USF&G had no duty to defend TPI with respect to the claims that arose out of the forest fire. 
(See Addendum at C.) 
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SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Regardless of whether an individual shareholder has standing to pursue claims against 
an insurer that has denied coverage to the corporation for claims made by third parties against the 
corporation, when a court rules that the insurer has no duty to defend the corporation, the individual 
shareholders become moot. Further, in this case, the claims of the Stocks against USF&G are entirely 
derivative of the claims of the corporation. Utah law provides that shareholders of a corporation may 
not bring suit in their individual capacity for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation, unless 
the wrong itself amounts to a violation of a duty arising from a contract or otherwise and owed 
directly to the shareholder. The Stocks were never sued and never attempted to individually invoke 
a duty to defend under the insurance contract.1 
*At the trial court level, USF&G had argued that the applicable statute of limitations, Utah 
Code Ann. § 31A-21-313(1), as written and enacted when the Stocks' alleged cause of action against 
USF&G would have accrued, provided that an action on a written policy or contract of insurance 
must be commenced "within 3 years after the inception of the loss." The inception of the loss was 
the point in time when the Stocks had to pay monies out in defense of TPI, and they would have had 
to have filed their claims by July of 1997 in order to meet that statute of limitations. At the end of 
April of 1996, however, the Utah legislature amended § 31 A-21-313(1) to apply to only "first party 
contracts." USF&G argued at the trial court level that the Stocks could not rely upon the extension 
of the statute of limitations and were bound by the statute of limitations in effect at the time their 
cause of action arose. 
In conducting additional research for this brief, however, USF&G came across the case of Del Monte 
Corp. v. Moore, 580 P.2d 224, 225 (Utah 1978) in which the Utah Supreme Court allowed the 
extension of the statutory period of limitation because the original cause of action was still alive when 
the statute of limitations was amended. This Court reaffirmed that proposition in State, Dept of 
Human Services v. Jacoby, 975 P.2d 939, 943 (Utah Ct. App. 1999). Based upon the rulings in Del 
Monte Corp. and Jacoby, USF&G withdraws its argument that the Stocks' claim is barred by the 




THE STOCKS HAVE NO STANDING TO RECOVER 
THEIR PERSONAL DAMAGES RESULTING FROM FUNDING 
THE DEFENSE THAT USF&G REFUSED TO PROVIDE. 
A. USF&G Owes No Coverage Under Its Contract of Insurance for Claims Made 
Against Timber Products and Stocks' Claims are Moot 
In Utah, the strong judicial policy against giving advisory opinions dictates that 
appellate court refrain from adjudicating moot questions. Richards v. Baum, 914 P.2d 719, 720 
(Utah 1996). Despite this strong public policy, the Stocks bring this appeal asserting that they have 
individual claims against USF&G for the costs they have incurred in defending TPI from claims 
arising out of the forest fire. 
Stocks have filed this appeal to pursue those claims - without disclosing to this Court 
that the trial court in the Original Action (which is the same judge in the same district as heard this 
action) had granted partial summary judgment to USF&G and found that USF&G had no duty to 
defend TPI from these exact claims. Indeed, despite knowing of the trial court's ruling, in their 
opening brief the Stocks allude to evidence being presented that USF&G's denial of coverage "was 
made in bad faith,...." (Appellants' Brief at p. 6.) 
If USF&G has no duty to defend the corporation that entered into the timber 
harvesting contract with the Redds and that was sued by the Redds in San Juan County, it certainly 
has no duty to reimburse individual shareholders of the corporation who have advanced and/or loaned 
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monies to the corporation to defend those claims. This Court need go no further in its analysis and 
should dismiss this appeal as moot.2 
!$• The Stocks Have No Standing as Shareholders to Raise Claims that are Rightly 
Those of the Corporation, 
Should this Honorable Court determine that the Stocks' appeal with respect to 
USF&G should not be dismissed as moot, then this Court should affirm the trial court below because 
the Stocks seek, as individual shareholders, to sue USF&G for wrongs allegedly done to their 
corporation, TPI. Specifically, the Stocks allege that the denial by USF&G of defense and indemnity 
with respect to the claims brought against TPI by the Redds and San Juan County required the Stocks 
"to finance Timber Products in defending itself from the claims." (Appellants' Brief at p. 6.) The 
Stocks also claim to have suffered emotional distress as a result of USF&G's action. 
Utah law provides that shareholders of a corporation may not bring suit in their 
individual capacity for a wrong done by a third party to the corporation. Norman v. Murray First 
Thrift, 596 P.2d 1028, 1031-32 (Utah 1979); DLB Collection Trust v. Harris, 893 P.2d 593, 596 
(Utah Ct App. 1995). In Norman, the Utah Supreme Court held that a sole shareholder of a 
corporation was not the real party in interest in a lawsuit for claims of improper disposition of 
collateral when the title to the collateral was in the name of the corporation and the loan agreement 
2It should be noted, however, that this Court has determined that whether to consider a 
mooted controversy is a matter of judicial policy, not law. Osguthorpe v. Osguthorpe, 
872 P.2d 1057, 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). 
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for which the collateral was placed was executed in the name of the corporation. Norman, 596 P.2d 
at 1031-32. 
The general rule regarding shareholder's capacity to bring an individual suit has an 
exception to it which provides that a shareholder may "bring an individual cause of action if the harm 
to the corporation also damaged the shareholder as an individual rather than a shareholder." DLB 
Collection Trust, 893 P.2d at 596 (emphasis in original). This exception does not arise, however, 
merely because the acts complained of damage both the corporation and the shareholder. Rather, the 
exception is confined to cases in which the wrong itself amounts to "violation of a duty arising from 
a contract or otherwise, and owed directly to the shareholder" personally. Id. 
In DLB Collection Trust, the Utah Court of Appeals analyzed the issue of whether an 
individual shareholder guaranteeing a loan was sufficient to invoke the exception and confer standing 
on the shareholder to bring an individual action against a third party who had allegedly wronged the 
corporation. In analyzing that claim, this Court examined the case of Nicholson v. Ash, 
800 P.2d 1352 (Colo. Ct. App. 1990), and made the following observation: 
The court delineated several reasons why a stockholder, who 
was also a guarantor of corporate debt, is precluded from asserting a 
personal right of action against a third party whose actions have 
resulted in damage to the corporation. Namely, it is the corporation 
that has suffered direct injury, and any damage resulting to the 
stockholder is merely indirect; requiring the claim to be pursued on 
behalf of the corporation prevents multiplicity of suits by various 
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stockholders; and any proceeds from the litigation will be treated as 
corporate assets and will be available to satisfy both creditors and 
other stockholders' claims. Nicholson, 800 P.2d at 1356. 
893 P.2d at 597. 
This Court adopted the reasoning in Nicholson and affirmed the trial court's decision 
that the individual shareholder in DLB Collection Trust had not suffered a loss that was unique - over 
claims of other shareholders - and did not create a duty owed to the shareholder personally. This is 
the general rule across the United States. See, e.g., Labovitz v. Washington Times Corp., 
172 F.3d 897, 900-903 (D.C Cir. 1999) (shareholders can bring an individual claim if they suffer 
injuries directly or independently of the corporation; claims based on injury to the corporation, 
however, are derivative in nature and any damages suffered are owed to the corporation; to determine 
whether claims are individual or derivative, courts must look to the nature of the wrongs alleged in 
the body of the complaint, not to the plaintiffs' designation or stated intention); Hammes v. AAMCO 
Transmissions, Inc., 33 F.3d 774, 777 (7th Cir. 1994) ("shareholders do not have standing to sue for 
harms to the corporation, or even for the derivative harm to themselves that might arise from a tort 
or other wrong to the corporation.").3 
3See also, Lui Ciro, Inc. v. Ciro, Inc., 895 F.Supp. 1365, 1380-81 (D. Haw. 1995) 
(guarantors of corporation's debt, even if those guarantors are also stockholders, do not have 
standing to bring action if only harm suffered is derivative of harm corporation suffered); Nome 
Commercial Co. v. Nat 'I Bank of Alaska, 948 P.2d 443,452-53 (Alaska 1997) (fact that shareholders 
had to lend corporation money as a result of allegedly improper action by bank did not entitled 
individual shareholders to damages because they did not suffer damages that could not be recovered 
in an action by the corporation). 
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The principles of law discussed above are dispositive of the Stocks' claims against 
USF&G in this case. The counterclaims by the Redd Defendants and the claims by San Juan County 
were against TPI only. Neither Fred nor Brenda Stocks are named as defendants in any action. Like 
the shareholders in DLB Collection Trust, the Stocks' status as sole shareholders and guarantor of 
Timber Products does not enhance their status over and above shareholder status, nor does it create 
a duty which USF&G owes to the Stocks personally, even though they also are named insureds along 
with TPI under the USF&G contract of insurance. 
InS.W. Jordan v. UnitedStates Fidelity andGuaranty Co., etal, 843 F.Supp. 164 
(S.D. Miss. 1993), an insured electrical contractor corporation and the contractor's principal 
("S.W. Jordan") brought an action against USF&G and Fidelity and Guaranty Insurance Company 
("FGIC"), alleging bad faith failure to settle a claim. In analyzing whether S.W. Jordan had a 
personal cause of action for intentional infliction of emotional distress, the court noted that in 
Mississippi, an action to redress injuries to a corporation, whether arising in contract or in tort, 
cannot be maintained by a stockholder in his or her own name, but must be brought by the 
corporation because the action belongs to the corporation and not the individual stockholder even 
though the complaining stockholder owns all or substantially all of the stock of the corporation. 
843 F.Supp. at 175. The court also noted that there was an exception to this rule under Mississippi 
law that arises where the stockholder seeks damage for the violation of a duty owed directly to the 
stockholder. Id. In finding that the exception had no application to the facts of the case, the court 
ruled: 
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Though S.W. Jordan was a named insured under the FGIC 
policy, this suit does not involve the breach of duty owing to 
S.W. Jordan as an insured. Rather, the claims in this action concerned 
alleged breaches of duties owed to the corporation and seek to redress 
a wrong allegedly done solely to the corporation. And there is 
nothing to indicate that S.W. Jordan had any potential individual 
exposure. Under these circumstances, S.W. Jordan lacks standing to 
sue. 
Id. See also, Kush v. American States Ins, Co,, 853 F.2d 1380 (7th Cir. 1988) (sole shareholder of 
insured corporation had no claim against liability insurer for intentional infliction of emotional distress 
allegedly arising out of insurer's handling of corporation's claims; shareholder was not policyholder 
or beneficiary of policy). 
The Stocks allege that they have suffered emotional distress because they have 
individually had to loan monies to the corporation and have somehow suffered some sort of individual 
harm as a result of claims brought against the corporation. That simply is not sufficient to allow them 
to bring their own, individual actions. 
In Herzing v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 907 S.W.2d 574 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995), 
corporations and individuals brought actions against the life insurer seeking damages for the insurer's 
agent's allegedly fraudulent activities in procuring loans for the corporations. For example, Mary 
Lindsay owned Multi-Communications, Inc., a dormant corporation. She and her husband were 
trying to locate funding for the corporation to establish a cable TV system and other projects. They 
began discussions with the insurer's agent, and he represented that he could obtain a self-liquidating 
$55 million loan with Metropolitan Life, but he would require a $75,000.00 up-front brokerage fee 
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to consummate the loan and the purchase of a $500,000.00 annuity on each of them. The Lindsays 
paid the brokerage fee and purchased the annuities, but no loan was obtained and the up-front money 
was not refunded. 907 S.W.2d at 577. 
The Lindsays, the Titlows and other individuals who had paid money out of their own 
pockets on behalf of their corporations sought to make a recovery for mental anguish. The Texas 
Court of Appeals noted there was no disagreement between the parties that a corporate stockholder 
does not have a derivative action where the wrong has been committed only against a corporation 
and that there was an exception that a stockholder may have a cause of action against a third party 
where there is a direct injury to the stockholder in the stockholder's individual capacity and such 
claim is independent of any duty owed to the corporation. The Texas Court of Appeals found that 
the Lindsays and others had no standing to bring their individual claims: 
We hold that the trial court properly excluded evidence of 
mental anguish suffered by the Lindsays and Titlows. Their actions as 
stockholders were solely to obtain a corporate loan. The loss suffered 
by the corporations in not obtaining the loan was the corporation's 
loss; those losses did not give rise to a stockholder's derivative action 
nor a personal action by the Lindsays and Titlows. 
Id. at 584. 
The Stocks' claims of emotional distress as a result of the denial of coverage to TPI 
must fail also. In Maryland Staffing Services, Inc. v. Manpower, Inc., 936 F.Supp. 1494 (E.D. Wis. 
1996), a franchisee and its individual owners brought suit against the franchisor alleging that the 
franchisor had overcharged it for workers compensation and liability insurance. Defendants moved 
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to dismiss the claims of the individual plaintiffs, John and Nancy Schandonnet (the "Schandonnets"), 
who were the owners and officers of Maryland Staffing, on the ground they lacked the standing to 
pursue the claims. 
The court began its analysis by enunciating the general principle that a corporate 
shareholder does not have an individual right of action against third persons for damages to the 
shareholder resulting indirectly from injury to the corporation. The court recognized the exception 
to the general rule such as where a contractual duty exists between the wrongdoer and the 
shareholder or where the shareholder suffers an injury separate and distinct from that suffered by 
other shareholders. The court noted that the Schandonnets asserted that they had suffered numerous 
injuries independent from those suffered by the corporation, including personal pain, suffering, 
humiliation, emotional distress and mental anguish. 936 F.Supp. at 1498-99. 
The court rejected the plaintiffs' characterization of the claims and concluded: "that 
the injuries suffered by the individual plaintiffs are not separate and distinct from those suffered by 
the corporation." Id. at 1499. The court held that the alleged injuries that plaintiff had suffered were 
derivative of the injuries to Maryland Staffing because "the individual plaintiff suffered mental and 
physical injuries as a result of the financial damages incurred by the corporation." The court held: 
Obviously investors in a firm suffer when the firm incurs a loss, 
"yet only the firm may vindicate the rights at issue."... (citations 
omitted). As was the case in Flynn /v. Merick, 881 F.2d 446 (7* Cir. 
1989)], here "[i]t is clear that the alleged injury is an injury to the 
corporation - an injury to the shareholders was an indirect result of 
the damage done to the corporation and as such, it does not create the 
necessary direct and independent harm required to maintain 
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shareholder standing." Flynn, 881 F.2d at 449. Maryland Staffing is 
the only party authorized to vindicate its rights vis-a-vis Manpower. 
Id. at 1499. 
It was only TPI that was sued as a result of the forest fire, and it was only TPI that 
had been denied coverage for the claims brought against TPI. It was only TPI that had the right to 
seek any available redress from USF&G.4 The claims of the Stocks individually are based on the 
alleged wrongs done to TPI, and the trial court's dismissal should be affirmed. 
The cases cited by the Stocks in their brief do not contravene the analysis set forth 
above. For example, in Wilson v. Askew, 709 F.Supp. 146 (W.D. Ark. 1989), a fifty percent 
shareholder in a Venezuelan corporation invested %VA million in the corporation. The other 
shareholders diverted the profits in the corporation, and the plaintiff sued alleging racketeering and 
fraud claims. The court found that the plaintiff had stated an individual injury - loss of the initial 
investment as opposed to the right to share in the profits - and not a corporate one and had standing 
to bring this suit against the other shareholders. The possible application of a shareholder's derivative 
action has nothing to do with this Court's analysis of the Stocks' assertion that they are entitled to 
bring their own bad faith claims against USF&G. 
Similarly, the case of Mason v. FDIC, 888 F.Supp. 799 (S.D. Tex. 1995), is also of 
no aid to this Court in analyzing the issues before it. Mason involved a shareholder of a corporation 
4Utah Code Ann. § 16-10a-622 provides that "shareholders" as such, are not liable to the 
corporation's creditors nor are they personally liable for the debts of the corporation. 
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that had purchased a radio station financed by a line of credit and loan from a bank, and who had 
brought his suit against the FDIC, as a receiver of the bank, under various Texas statutory provisions. 
For example, the court found that the plaintiff had individual standing to bring a breach of warranty 
claim concerning the loan agreement between the bank and the corporation because the plaintiff was 
a "interested party" under Tex. Bus. & Com. Code Ann. §5.111(a). Such reasoning is not relevant 
or helpful to this Court in determining whether the Stocks have an individual right to bring a bad faith 
claim against USF&G because, as shareholders, they had to pay the defense costs incurred by TPI 
as a result of the fire claim. DLB Collection Trust, S. W. Jordan and the other cases advanced in this 
brief are controlling and dispositive. 
CONCLUSION 
Because in the Original Action the trial court has granted USF&G summary judgment 
that it has no duty to defend TPI, it has no duty to reimburse the Stocks for defense costs and their 
claim is moot. Further, the Stocks have no standing individually to bring claims for the bad faith 
denial of coverage to the corporation, because their claims are solely derivative of harm suffered by 
the corporation. 
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This Court should affirm the trial court's dismissal of Plaintiffs' Complaint. 
DATED this <J^ day of December, 1999. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
GARY^ JOHNSON 
Attorneys for Defendant and Appellee 
USF&G 
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1. The Redd Defendants entered into a contract with Timber 
Products, Inc. (Timber Products) effective as of March 12, 1992, 
which permitted Timber Products to timber certain forest land owned 
by the Redd Defendants (Property) under terms beneficial to both 
Timber Products and the Redd Defendants. See Agreement for Timber 
Stand Improvement and for Sale of Timber (Agreement), a copy of 
which is attached as Exhibit AA to the Verified Complaint filed 
herein. 
2. The Property owned by the Redd Defendants is described in 
the Financing Statements incorporated herein and attached hereto as 
Exhibits 1 and 2 (Financing Statements). 
3. The Redd Defendants at all relevant times have performed 
the stipulations, conditions, and agreements stated in the 
Agreement to be oerformed on their part at the time and in the 
manner specified. 
4. The Agreement provides, inter alia: 
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6. Purchaser shall conduct all operations 
on the Property in a workmanlike manner and in 
accordance with good practices. . . . 
7. Purchaser shall save harmless and fully 
indemnify Seller, his agents and employees 
against any and all liability, loss, or damage of 
every kind and nature, including attorney's fees, 
arising from any act by, omission of, or 
negligence of Purchaser or its subcontractors, or 
the officers, agents or employees of either, 
while conducting operations in accordance with 
this Agreement or while on or about the Property, 
or arising from any debt, expense or claim 
incurred by the Purchaser or its subcontractors, 
or the officers, agents or employees of either 
8. Purchaser shall secure and maintain at 
all times while conducting operations under this 
Agreement, liability insurance covering all such 
operations by or on behalf of the Purchaser 
issued by a company or companies acceptable to 
Seller, with total aggregate policy limits not 
less than $2,000,000 and individual occurrence 
limits of not less than $1,000,000. Purchaser 
shall furnish to Seller, prior to the 
commencement of operations hereunder and as long 
thereafter as such operations continue, 
certificates of the issuing insurance company or 
companies evidencing that the above required 
insurance is in force and effect and agreeing 
that said insurance will not be cancelled without 
having given at least 10 days advance written 
notice to Seller. 
10. Purchaser, in conducting all of its 
operations pursuant to this Agreement, shall 
comply with all applicable laws and regulations 
of the state in which the operations are 
conducted and of the United States of America 
and, without in any way limiting the foregoing, 
shall specifically comply with all laws and 
regulations pertaining to air and water 
pollution. Purchaser shall indemnify and hold 
Seller harmless from any and all liability, 
including attorney's fees, occasioned by 
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Purchaser's failure to comply with the laws and 
regulations referred to in this paragraph. 
18. Purchaser and its subcontractors, and 
the agents and employees of each, shall take all 
reasonable precautions to prevent the origin and 
spread of fire on the Property and shall take 
immediate and independent action to suppress all 
fires on the Property. 
21. . . . In the event of a fire 
established to have been caused by the operations 
of Purchaser hereunder which destroys Ponderosa 
Pine timber on the Property which Purchaser is 
obligated to purchase hereunder, Purchaser shall 
be obligated to pay Seller for that Ponderosa 
Pine timber destroyed the purchase price provided 
herein. In the event of a fire caused by the 
operation of Purchaser hereunder which destroys 
timber which Purchaser does not have the right to 
purchase hereunder, Purchaser will pay Seller the 
value of such timber destroyed. 
23. In the event that Purchaser defaults in 
any of the provisions of this Agreement to be 
performed by Purchaser, Seller may, at its 
option, give written notice to Purchaser 
specifying the default. If the default is not 
corrected, or if good faith efforts to correct 
the default have not been commenced within sixty 
(60) days after the receipt of the notice of 
default by Purchaser, this Agreement shall 
terminate and Purchaser shall have no further 
rights hereunder. In that event, all monies paid 
by Purchaser to Seller may be retained by Seller 
as liquidated damages for the nonperformance of 
this Agreement. 
26. In any suit or action brought upon or 
arising out of this Agreement, and upon any 
appeal thereof, the losing party agrees to pay 
the prevailing party's reasonable attorney's fees 
to be fixed by the trial and appellate courts 
respectively. 
5. The Agreement also provides the Redd Defendants with a 
security interest in the timber that is subject to sale pursuant to 
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the Agreement, See Agreement at 1 4. That interest has been 
perfected. See Financing Statements. 
6. After entering into the Agreement with the Redd 
Defendants, Timber Products allegedly entered into a logging 
contract with defendant Don Applegate d/b/a Don Applegate 
Construction (Applegate). See Complaint at U 18. 
7. Applegate proceeded to commence timbering the Property as 
Timber Products1 subcontractor. 
8. Gary Duane Squires (Squires) is an officer, agent, or 
employee of Timber Products or its subcontractor, Applegate. 
9. On June 14, 1994, Squires started a forest fire that 
destroyed or damaged approximately 1363 acres of timber owned by 
the Redd Defendants. 
10. On June 14, 1994, the weather conditions on the Property 
were hot and dry. 
11. Upon information and belief, Squires started the fire by 
re-filling his leaky chain saw with oil and gas on a downed tree. 
The spark arrester had been removed from the saw. 
12. Squires pled guilty to Causing a Catastrophe and was 
sentenced by the Seventh Judicial District Court on November 21, 
1994. 
13. At a meeting held on or about June 23, 1994, Timber 
Products1 president Fred Stocks and his wife, Brenda Stocks, 
provided Paul Redd with a cover sheet of insurance policy No. 
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1MP30088353900 from United States Fidelity and Guaranty Company 
(USF&G Policy) that allegedly covered Timber Products for the fire 
damage and a cover sheet from Northfield Insurance Company 
(Northfield) that allegedly covered Applegate for the fire damage, 
14. USF&G denies coverage on Timber Products' claim against 
it arising out of the June 14, 1994 fire. The Redd Defendants were 
notified by USF&G of this denial by letter dated October 28, 1994. 
15. USF&G denies coverage in part based upon Form CG22541185, 
titled "Exclusion — Logging and Lumbering Operations" (Logging 
Exclusion), which is part of the USF&G Policy. 
16. Even if the Logging Exclusion does not bar coverage, the 
USF&G Policy declaration page contains a fire damage limit of 
$50,000. 
17. Northfield also denies coverage on Timber Products' claim 
arising out of the June 14, 1994 fire. 
18. Upon discovering that Timber Products had not maintained 
insurance as required by the Agreement, and after communicating 
with representatives of Timber Products, the Redd Defendants 
declared Timber Products in default. See Letter from Gregory 
Hoskin to Fred Stocks dated December 9, 1994 (Default Letter), a 
copy of which is attached to the Verified Complaint as Exhibit CC. 
The Default Letter was hand delivered to Timber Products by Paul 
Redd on December 13, 1994. 
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19. In the Default Letter, the Redd Defendants listed Timber 
Products' obligations under the Agreement, including its obligation 
to pay for the Redd Defendants1 losses caused by the fire. The 
Redd Defendants demanded assurance of Timber Products1 performance 
by demanding reimbursement of $1.6 million in losses. The Redd 
Defendants explained that failure to pay the losses within the 60-
day period provided by the Agreement would result in termination of 
the Agreement. 
20. The 60-day period expired on February 11, 1995. 
21. Timber Products failed to cure its default or commence 
good faith efforts to correct its default within the 60-day period. 
22. Based upon initial expert analysis of aerial photographs 
taken of the area burned by the June 14, 1994 fire, damage to the 
Redd Defendants due to the fire is now estimated at approximately 
$3.8 million. 
FIRST COUNTERCLAIM 
[Declaratory Judgment — Timber Products' Default] 
23. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
24. There is now existing between Timber Products and the 
Redd Defendants an actual, justiciable controversy in which the 
Redd Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights 
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and further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances 
as set forth herein. 
25. The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief 
pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that 
Timber Products defaulted on its obligations under the Agreement 
and that the Redd Defendants lawfully terminated the Agreement on 
February 11, 1995. 
SECOND COUNTERCLAIM 
[Declaratory Judgment — Material Breach by Timber Products] 
26. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
27. There is now existing between Timber Products and the 
Redd Defendants an actual, justiciable controversy in which the 
Redd Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights 
and further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances 
as set forth herein. 
28. The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief 
pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that 
Timber Products materially and substantially breached the 




[Declaratory Judgment — Security Interest] 
29. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
30. There is now existing between Timber Products and the 
Redd Defendants an actual, justiciable controversy in which the 
Redd Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights 
and further relief/ due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances 
as set forth herein. 
31. The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief 
pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that 
the Redd Defendants may lawfully foreclose on their security 
interest in the timber that is secured by the Agreement and the 
Financing Statements. 
FOURTH COUNTERCLAIM 
[Declaratory Judgment — Termination Based Upon 
Timber Products' Failure to Provide Adequate Assurance] 
32. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
33. There is now existing between Timber Products and the 
Redd Defendants an actual judiciable controversy in which the Redd 
Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights and 
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further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances as 
set forth herein. 
34. The Agreement is, at least in part, a contract for the 
sale of goods pursuant to section 70A-2-107(2), Utah Code Ann. 
35. The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief 
pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that 
Timber Products repudiated the Agreement pursuant to section 70A-2-
609, Utah Code Ann., by failing to provide adequate assurance of 
its ability to perform its obligations after receiving the Default 
Letter. 
FIFTH COUNTERCLAIM 
[Declaratory Judgment — Redd Defendants1 
Right To Take Possession of Collateral] 
36. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
37. There is now existing between Timber Products and the 
Redd Defendants an actual judiciable controversy in which the Redd 
Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights and 
further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances as 
set forth herein. 
38. The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief 
pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that 
Timber Products is in default of the Agreement, thereby entitling 
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the Redd Defendants to take possession of the collateral secured by 
the Agreement and the Financing Statements pursuant to section 
70A-9-503, Utah Code Ann. 
SIXTH COUNTERCLAIM 
[Declaratory Judgment — Redd Defendants1 
Right To Dispose of Collateral] 
39. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
40. There is now existing between Timber Products and the 
Redd Defendants an actual judiciable controversy in which the Redd 
Defendants are entitled to have a declaration of their rights and 
further relief, due to the facts, conditions, and circumstances as 
set forth herein. 
41. The Redd Defendants therefore seek declaratory relief 
pursuant to title 78, chapter 33, Utah Code Ann., adjudging that 
Timber Products is in default and the Redd Defendants have the 
right to dispose of the collateral secured by the Agreement and 
Financing Statements, pursuant to section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Ann. 
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SEVENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
[Damages — Breach of Contract by Timber Products] 
42. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
43. Timber Products substantially and materially breached the 
Agreement by failing to maintain the insurance required by 
paragraph 8 of the Agreement. 
44. As a result of Timber Products' breach of the Agreement, 
the Redd Defendants have incurred at least $3.8 million in damages, 
including special damages for the cost incurred in containing and 
extinguishing the June 14, 1994 fire, the cost of rehabilitating 
the burned area (including re-seeding, planting seedlings, erosion 
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and re-marking timber), the 
loss of seed trees, grazing losses, loss of earnings and profits 
due to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat. 
45. The foregoing special damages were known to Timber 
Products to be the probable consequences of a breach at the time it 
entered into the Agreement. 
EIGHTH COUNTERCLAIM 
[Damages — Breach of Contract by Timber Products] 
46. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
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47. Timber Products substantially and materially breached the 
Agreement by failing to indemnify the Redd Defendants for losses 
arising from the acts of Applegate and/or Squires, as required by 
paragraph 7 of the Agreement, 
48. As a result of Timber Products1 breach of the Agreement, 
the Redd Defendants have incurred at least $3.8 million in damages, 
including special damages for the cost incurred in containing and 
extinguishing the June 14, 1994 fire, the cost of rehabilitating 
the burned area (including re-seeding, planting seedlings, erosion 
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and re-marking timber), the 
loss of seed trees, grazing losses, loss of earnings and profits 
due to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat. 
49. The foregoing special damages were known to Timber 
Products to be the probable consequences of a breach at the time it 
entered into the Agreement. 
NINTH COUNTERCLAIM 
[Damages — Breach of Contract by Timber Products] 
50. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
51. Timber Products substantially and materially breached the 
Agreement by: 
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a. failing to perform operations in a workmanlike 
manner and in accordance with good practices as required 
by paragraph 6 of the Agreement; 
b. failing to comply with applicable state and 
federal regulations, as required by paragraph 10 of the 
Agreement; 
c. failing to take all reasonable precautions to 
prevent the origin and spread of fire as required by 
paragraph 20 of the Agreement; and 
d. failing to pay the Redd Defendants for 
destroyed timber as required by paragraph 21 of the 
Agreement. 
52. As a result of Timber Products1 breach of the Agreement, 
the Redd Defendants have incurred at least $3.8 million in damages, 
including special damages for the cost incurred in containing and 
extinguishing the June 14, 1994 fire, the cost of rehabilitating 
the burned area (including re-seeding, planting seedlings, erosion 
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and re-marking timber), the 
loss of seed trees? grazing losses, loss of earnings and profits 
due to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat. 
53. The foregoing special damages were known to Timber 
Products to be the probable consequences of a breach at the time it 
entered into the Agreement. 
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TENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
[Damages — Negligence of Timber Products] 
54. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
55. On June 14, 1994, Timber Products owed a duty of 
reasonable care to the Redd Defendants by virtue of the special 
relationship between the parties arising out of the Agreement. 
56. The duty owed to the Redd Defendants by Timber Products 
was nondelegable. 
57. Timber Products fell below the standard of reasonable 
care by authorizing its subcontractor Applegate to timber on the 
Property on June 14, 1994, because the conditions in the forest 
created an unreasonable risk of fire for timbering operations. 
58. Timber Products also fell below the reasonable standard 
of care by failing to obtain adequate fire insurance coverage for 
its timbering operations as contemplated by the Agreement and as 
reasonably necessary to protect against the risk of fire of those 
operations. 
59. As a direct and proximate result of Timber Products' 
negligence in commencing timbering operations on the Property on 
June 14, 1994, the Redd Defendants sustained damages including 
special damages for the cost incurred in containing and 
extinguishing the June 14, 1994, fire, the cost of rehabilitating 
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the burned area (including reseeding, planting seedlings, erosion 
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and remarking timber), the 
loss of seed trees, grazing losses, loss of earning and profits due 
to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat. 
ELEVENTH COUNTERCLAIM 
[Injunctive Relief — Conversion by Timber Products] 
60. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here. 
61. Timber Products has threatened to resume timbering 
operations on the Property beginning in June, 1995. 
62. If Timber Products resumes such timbering activity in 
June, 1995, or thereafter, it will be wrongfully entering upon the 
Property, without authority, and unlawfully cutting down and 
carrying away and converting to its own use timber grown thereon to 
the damage of the Redd Defendants. 
63. The Redd Defendants therefore seek injunctive relief 
pursuant to Rule 65A, U.R.C.P., to prevent Timber Products, 
Applegate, and any of their employees, servants, independent 
contractors, or agents from entering upon the Property. 
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CROSS CLAIM AGAINST APPLEGATE DEFENDANTS 
[Damages — Negligence of Applegate] 
64. The Redd Defendants adopt and reallege paragraphs 1 
through 22 of the Counterclaim Factual Allegations as if set forth 
in full here, 
65. Applegate, including its employee Gary Duane Squires, 
owed a duty of reasonable care to the Redd Defendants while 
conducting timbering operations on the Property. 
66. Applegate knew of the danger created by the hot and dry 
weather conditions on the Property on June 14, 1994. 
67. Applegate breached its duty to use reasonable care for 
the protection of the Property on June 14, 1994. 
68. Applegatefs actions directly and proximately caused the 
forest fire on the Property on June 14, 1994. 
69. As a direct and proximate result of Applegate*s actions, 
the Redd Defendants have incurred at least $3.8 million in damages, 
including special damages for the cost incurred in containing and 
extinguishing the June 14, 1994, fire, the cost of rehabilitating 
the burned area (including reseeding, planting seedlings, erosion 
control, fencing, rebuilding fences, and remarking timber), the 
loss of seed trees, grazing losses, loss of earning and profits due 
to the fire, loss of land value, hunting, and wildlife habitat. 
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WHEREFORE, the Redd Defendants request that the Court: 
A. Dismiss Timber Products' Complaint. 
B. Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in 
favor of the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' first 
counterclaim adjudging that Timber Products defaulted on its 
obligations under the Agreement and that the Redd Defendants 
lawfully terminated the Agreement on February 11, 1995. 
C. Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in 
favor of the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants * second 
counterclaim adjudging that Timber Products materially and 
substantially breached the Agreement, thereby terminating the 
Agreement and entitling the Redd Defendants to damages. 
D. Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in 
favor of the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants1 third 
counterclaim adjudging that the Redd Defendants may lawfully 
foreclose on their security interest in the timber that is secured 
by the Agreement and the Financing Statements. 
E. Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in 
favor of the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' fourth 
counterclaim adjudging that Timber Products repudiated the 
Agreement pursuant to section 70A-2-609, Utah Code Ann., by failing 
to provide adequate assurance of its ability to perform its 
obligations under the Agreement after receiving the Default Letter. 
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F. Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in 
favor of the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants fifth 
counterclaim adjudging that Timber Products is in default of the 
Agreement, thereby entitling the Redd Defendants to take possession 
of the collateral secured by the Agreement and the Financing 
Statements, pursuant to section 70A-9-503, Utah Code Ann. 
G. Enter declaratory judgment against Timber Products and in 
favor of the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' sixth 
counterclaim adjudging that Timber Products is in default of the 
Agreement and that the Redd Defendants have the right to dispose of 
the collateral secured by the Agreement and the Financing 
Statements pursuant to section 70A-9-504, Utah Code Ann. 
H. Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of 
the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants1 seventh counterclaim 
awarding damages, including special damages, to be shown at trial. 
I. Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of 
the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' eighth counterclaim 
awarding damages, including special damages, to be shown at trial. 
J. Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of 
the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' ninth counterclaim 
awarding damages, including special damages, to be shown at trial. 
19 
K. Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of 
the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants1 tenth counterclaim 
awarding damages, including special damages, to be awarded at 
trial. 
L. Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of 
the Redd Defendants on the Redd Defendants' eleventh counterclaim 
and order injunctive relief prohibiting Timber Products, Applegate, 
and any of their employees, servants, independent contractors, or 
agents from entering upon the Property without the express consent 
of the Redd Defendants. 
M. Enter judgment against Applegate and in favor of the Redd 
Defendants on the Redd Defendants1 cross claim awarding damages, 
including special damages, to be shown at trial. 
N. Enter judgment against Timber Products and in favor of 
the Redd Defendants for the Redd Defendants' attorneys' fees 
pursuant to paragraph 26 of the Agreement. 
0. Treble all damages related to the unlawful cutting down, 
carrying off, or injuring of trees or timber on the Property 
pursuant to section 78-38-3, Utah Code Ann. 
P. Grant such other and further relief as it deems 
appropriate, including interest, pre-judgment interest, and costs. 
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ATTACHMENT B 
Ruling on Motion to Intervene and 
Ruling on Amended Motion for Order Granting Leave 
to File and Serve Third Amended Complaint 
Timber Products, Inc. v. Paul David Redd, etal 
Civil No. 940700057 
(R. 90-95) 
'/-< 
DATED this / ? day of June, 1995. 
KELLER, JENSEN & BUNNELL 
By Michael R. Jensen, #1685 
and 
HOSKIN, FARINA, ALDRICH & KAMPF 
Professional Corporation 
By '^^ ^.^A 
Gregory K. Hoskin, CO #424 
Matthew G. Weber, CO #18615 
Post Office Box 40 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
(970) 242-4903 
Attorneys for Defendants: 
Paul David Redd; Diane B. Redd; 
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IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PAUL DAVID REDD, et al. , 
Defendants. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs 
GARY DUANE SQUIRES, et al., 
Defendants. 
TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, a 
Corporation; and THE TALBERT 
CORPORATION, a Corporation, 
RULING ON MOTION TO 
INTERVENE AND RULING ON 
AMENDED MOTION FOR ORDER 
GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE 
AND SERVE THIRD AMENDED 
COMPLAINT 
Third Party Defendants. 
2 
MITCHELL KELLING dba KELLING 
INSURANCE AGENCY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs . 
TRANSWESTERN GENERAL AGENCY, 
INC. , 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil No. 940700057 
Plaintiff filed a Motion to Intervene and a Motion for Order 
Granting Leave to File and Serve Third Amended Complaint to which 
the Redd Defendants have no objection. Defendants Northfield, 
USF&G, Kellmg, and the Talbert Corporation filed Memorandums m 
Opposition. The Court has read the Memorandum, considered the law 
and now rules as follows: 
The Motions are denied for the reasons that; 
1. The Motions are untimely. The Court has previously 
allowed the Plaintiff to file two Amended Complaints. This lawsuit 
was filed in December of 1994. Substantial written and deposition 
discovery has been completed and it would be prejudicial to add new 
parties with new claims and to also allow new claims to be asserted 
3 
by existing parties to which Defendants would then be entitled to 
discovery, resulting in additional delay and expense. 
The Court is also not satisfied that the new claims 
could not have been brought much earlier in the proceedings. To 
allow them to intervene at this stage of the proceedings would 
condone not asserting all claims known much earlier in the action. 
2. The cases advanced by Defendant Northfleld persuade 
the Court that the law in Utah is that a shareholder of a 
corporation may not bring a suit m his individual capacity as a 
shareholder for the wrong done to the corporation by a third 
person. The Stocks' status as a guarantor of corporate debt does 
not enhance their status as shareholder and does not establish a 
duty which Defendants owed to the Stocks personally. The Stocks 
are therefore without standing to bring the action against 
Northfleld contemplated by the proposed Third Amended Complaint. 
DATED this /f- day of July, 1997. 
\<LSJ62-
BRYCE KT BRYNER 
District Court Judge 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the \0 day of July, 1997, a true 
and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON MOTION TO INTERVENE AND 
RULING ON AMENDED MOTION FOR ORDER GRANTING LEAVE TO FILE AND SERVE 
THIRD AMENDED COMPLAINT was mailed, postage prepaid, to the 
following: 
Michael R. Jensen 
Attorney at Law 
JENSEN & BUNNELL 
90 West 100 North 
Price, Utah 84501 
Gregory K. Hoskin 
Matthew G. Weber 
Attorneys at Law 
HOSKIN, FARINA, ALDRICH & KAMPF 
Professional Corporation 
Post Office Box 40 
Grand Junction, Colorado 81502 
Ray G. Martineau 
Attorney at Law 
3 098 Highland Drive, 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Gary L. Johnson 
Attorney at Law 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
50 South Main, 7th Floor 




Michael L. Deamer 
Attorney at Law 
RANDLE, DEAMER, ZARR & LEE, P.C. 
139 East South Temple, Suite 330 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
S. Baird Morgan 
Attorney at Law 
STRONG Sc HANNI 
9 Exchange Place, Suite 600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dale J. Lambert 
Attorney at Law 
CHRISTENSEN & JENSEN, P.C. 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101-1410 
Ford G. Sculley 
Attorney at Law 
261 East 300 South, Suite 200 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Daniel Anderson 
Attorney at Law 
P.O. Box 275 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
Craig C. Halls 
San Juan County Attorney 
P.O. Box 850 
Monticello, Utah 84535 
David S. Cook 
85 West 400 Nortn 
Bountiful, Utah 84010 
6 
Gary Duane Squires 
P.O. Box 622 
Naturita, Colorado 81422 
^y^-> 
In compliance with the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
individuals n: . 3 special accommocaiions (including 
commuraca-. < and services) our-m; 'ne oroceeanr. 
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ATTACHMENT C 
Ruling on USF&G's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
Timber Products, Inc. v. Paul David Redd, etal 
Civil No. 940700057 
(Decided February 18, 1999) 
IN THE SEVENTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 




PAUL DAVID REDD, et al. , 
Defendants. 
SAN JUAN COUNTY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
GARY DUANE SQUIRES, et al. , 
Defendants. 
TIMBER PRODUCTS, INC., a 
Corporation, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
UNITED STATES FIDELITY AND 
GUARANTY COMPANY, a 
Corporation; and THE TALBERT 
CORPORATION, a Corporation, 
RULING ON USF&G'S MOTION FOR 
PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
Third Party Defendants. 
2 
MITCHELL KELLING dba KELLING 
INSURANCE AGENCY, 
Third Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
TRANSWESTERN GENERAL AGENCY, 
INC., 
Third Party Defendant. 
Civil No. 940700057 
Defendant USF&G's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment seeks a 
ruling that Endorsement CG 22 54 to the General Liability Policy is 
unambiguous and enforceable and therefore excludes coverage for 
property damage due to the fire that occurred in June of 1994. TPI 
responds by claiming that CG 22 54 is ambiguous, should be 
construed against USF&G, and that the endorsement is unenforceable. 
Under Utah law, whether contractual language is ambiguous is 
a question of law for the court to decide. The court finds that 
the exclusionary language contained in CG 22 54 is not reasonably 
susceptible to more than one interpretation. It does not have two 
or more plausible meanings. The exclusion eliminates coverage for 
property damage of any type caused by fire, but then goes on to 
broadly exclude any property damage to any vehicle while being 
loaded or unloaded, however caused. 
Because there is no ambiguity, no presumption arises in favor 
of TPI and the policy language should be construed according to its 
usual and ordinary meaning. An examination of the policy language 
of CG 22 54 reveals that it clearly excludes from coverage property 
3 
damage due to fire. No other interpretation can be ascribed to it 
as there is no other plausible meaning. 
The court also finds that under the general rules of 
interpretation of insurance contracts, CG 22 54 operates 
independently against the general declaration of insurance found in 
the policy. The general grants of coverage found on the 
declaration page and the contractual liability language do not 
serve to revive coverage. 
The court therefore finds that Endorsement CG 22 54 bars 
coverage for the property damage claims against USF&G, and it 
follows that USF&G has no duty to defend TPI with respect to those 
claims. 
Counsel for Defendant USF&G is directed to prepare a Partial 
Summary Judgment consistent with this ruling. 
DATED this / X day of February, 1999. 
District Court Judg 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on the day of February, 1999, a 
true and correct copy of the foregoing RULING ON USF&G'S MOTION FOR 
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